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FRANCO’S TECHNOCRACY AND SPAIN’S EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: 
HISTORIOGRAPHIC PARADOXES AND NEW CONCLUSIONS 
 
ROBERTO LOPEZ TORRIJOS  
 
Because the history of the very begining of Spanish relations with the 
European Economic Community (EEC) has been written according to Spanish 
expectations and without reference to Spain’s thankless past, one could affirm 
that the European history of Spain really starts in the future, not in the past. 
“Cuanto menor es el campo de experiencia más crece la expectative.”1 The 
result is a certain idea of historical progress, and if a historian uses this 
technique, the result becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. Most of the 
historiography of European-Spanish relations unquestionably chooses a moral 
preference, in favour of pro-Europeanism. And this moral preference becomes 
a strategic one that intervenes in the process of historical research. The 
consequence is a kind of teleology, that Spanish society, following its natural 
European path towards emancipation, adopted a more progressive European 
outlook and tone during the sixties and seventies. Implicit in this argument is 
that Franco’s external behaviour demonstrated the structural impracticability 
of the late dictatorship in the European context, most obviously Franco’s 
application to join the European Economic Community, in 1962, was rejected. 
Europe --the opposite of Franco’s Dictatorship-- was rational and optimal, and 
eventually Spain went there, but without Franco. This article focuses on the 
implications of this perspective, pointing out some of its coincidences, clichés 
and paradoxes and concludes with some new ideas about Spain’s path to 
Europe that considers Franco’s technocracy and its European ambitions within 
its ideological tradition.  
 
The article analyses historiographical interpretations of Franco’s 
application to the EEC in the first two parts, and the last part describes some 
preliminary conclusions of current research about Francoist technocracy and 
the intentions of their policies both in the internal and international contexts, 
introducing he concept that anti-liberal views of European integration for 
Spain were important. Throughout the article, the phrase ‘specialized 
historiography’ is going to be mentioned many times, referring to both the 
scholarly literature related to the European aspirations of Franco’s regime and 
the historiographical view of Europe as a long-term comparative reference in 
the study of Francoism and Spanish transition to democracy. Much of this 
historiographical stream is derived from the work of José María Jover 
Zamora2 and continued by historians of the history of Francoist engagement 
                                                 
1
 Julio Arostegui, La historia vivida, sobre la historia del presente, (Madrid: Alianza Ensayo, 
2004), 77.  
2
 Antonio Moreno Juste,  “La historia de las relaciones internacionales y de la política exterior 
española”, Ayer 42 (2001): 95.  Elena Hernández Sandoica, “José María Jover Zamora. In 
memoriam”, Ayer 68 (2007),  9-24. 
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with Europe, such as Antonio Moreno Juste and Juan Carlos Pereira 
Castañares. Here, the geopolitical position of Spain within Europe was a 
hallmark in the study of Spanish external relations: 
 
la posición de España, guste o no guste, es periférica […] Integrarse en 
Europa, estar con los del Centro, parece ser la mejor manera de 
compensar su excentricidad, y esta opción puede considerarse como una 
constante de la política exterior española [..] carácter fronterizo y 
periférico de España en Europa. 3 
 
Vivimos en un limbo de autosatisfacción: plenamente gozosos con el 
camino recorrido […] Tenemos que ser europeos como siempre lo hemos 
sido, abiertos hacia fuera […] Nuestra europeidad tiene que ser, como 
siempre lo ha sido, fronteriza. 4 
 
Professor Abellan’s studies of the late eighties, influenced by Ortega y 
Gasset, offered another influential perspective. Here the key element was the 
“esteem” for technocracy and politicians as elites that led to the historical 
process of transition from the late Franco regime to democracy. These 
historiographies are pro-European, which was again especially influenced by  
Ortega y Gasset’s  two favourite topics: Spanish distance from Europe and 
Spain’s “Tibetización” (its exclusion from the European cultural 
mainstream).5  
 
The consolidation and spread of this historiography coincided with the 
growing presence of Spain at the very heart of the European Union (previously 
to the economic crisis of the Eurozone and its negative consequences for the 
both Spanish economy and its self-perception, of course). The ‘specialized 
historiography’ that developed built upon studies that underlined the European 
convergence of Spanish society and economy during the sixties and seventies. 
Some of these representative authors, such as Santos Juliá, José Luis García 
Delgado, José María Beneyto or Javier Varela, are equally important for this 
article.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                
 
3
 Antonio Moreno Juste, “Del ‘Problema de España’ a la ‘España europeizada’: 
excepcionalidad y normalización en la posición de España en Europa” in La política exterior 
de España (1800-2003) Historia, condicionantes y Escenarios, ed. Juan Carlos  Pereira 
Castañares ( Barcelona: Ariel, 2003), 306. 
4
 Emilio Lamo de Espinosa, “La normalización de España, España, Europa y la modernidad” 
Claves 111 (2001): 16. 
5
 José Luis Abellán, "El significado de la idea de Europa en la política y en la historia de 
España", Sistema 86-87  (1988), 31-44. 
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Europe as a moral option 
 
For the historiography specialized on Francoist engagement with the 
world, the Spanish preference for an argument grounded in the persistence of 
internal conflict and inadequate modernization had become axiomatic until the 
early eighties. Quoting Ismael Saz, Spanish history of the XXth century had 
been understood and written as a collective upset, thanks to a collection of 
weakness, frustrations and failures.  In fact, a forty-year dictatorship seemed 
the result of theses historical dynamics. But the Spanish transition to 
democracy happened, which was mostly explained as being the start of typical 
“European” behavior and patterns in Spain. Spain left behind its natural 
tendency to weakness and radicalism and now bet on union, progress and 
concorde with the rest of the continent. This recent, successful period in 
Spanish history led to a renovation of historiographical views, what meant that 
there was a concerted effort to set Spain within a longer European frame. 
Spanish historical dynamics were analyzed again and mostly reconsidered as 
modern, secular and European or, at least, underlining Western European 
parameters. This process of historiographical renovation was unfinished at late 
XXth century because the European focus of framing Spanish history suddenly 
ended in 1939, so that Franco’s Regime was kept out of historiographical 
reconsideration.6 These renovated interpretations found Franco’s dictatorship 
to be an important obstacle, even if other obstacles were passed over, such as 
such as the industrial revolution or liberalism. But this time was different, 
because the Transition happened “justo al contrario de como se esperaba” 7 
 
It was not easy to explain such a long dictatorship during the rise and 
consolidation of  democracies in West Europe. The dictatorship could only be  
characterized as a dysfunction of the normal, European course of modern 
Spain8. It was better to emphasize the emancipating change from the 
dictatorship to democracy, which finally united Spain with Europe, a point 
reinforced when Spainjoined with both the EEC and the currency union. A 
past of collective upset; a future full of shining mornings: 
 
Resuelta voluntad española de apertura e integración a escala 
continental reflejada en nuestra presencia en el grupo del euro. España 
ha consolidado un régimen democrático tras una larga experiencia 
dictatorial: el “ayer es nunca jamás” machadiano resuena ahora con 
más fuerza que nunca. Una capacidad de interlocución en las relaciones 
                                                 
6
 Ismael Saz "Paradojas de la historia. Paradojas de la historiografía. Las peripecias del 
  fascismo español", Hispania, 51/1 (2000): 207.  One of the best samples of the analisys by 
Saz is the historiographical evolution of the studies by Jordi Nadal. 
7
 Rafael Núñez Florencio, “La imagen de España en el mundo: la ‘marca España’” in La 
política exterior de España… Op. Cit., 199. 
8
 Roberto Mesa, "La normalización exterior de España" in Transición política y 
Consolidación democrática 1975-1986, ed. Ramón Cotarelo (Madrid, CIS, 1992). 
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exteriores, con Europa y en los grandes foros internacionales, inédita en 
la historia contemporánea española. 9 
 
Consequently, the contemporary history of Spain is now considered 
mostly normal and European, but only until the Civil War. Franco’s regime is 
usually characterized as an abnormaility, a parenthesis or a singularity. 
Manifestly this is a regenerationist drift10 because the future of Spain would be 
European, but its past was terribly Spanish. Most significant of all, when it 
comes to how exactly the specialized historiography responds the beginning of 
the Spanish relation with the EEC, the analysis becomes more predictable. 
Nobody doubts that Franco’s Regime attempting to join the EEC in the 1960s 
was a paradox, a joke, a tasteless joke. This embarrasing chapter of Spanish 
history is used to reveal the definitive contradiction of Spain at this time, 
because while Franco did not fit into Europe, Spanish society of the sixties and 
seventies was a “sociedad que cambiaba a ojos vista en la dirección de los 
países europeos”.11  Indeed, the event of Franco’s Regime aspiring to the 
same Europe, which is proudly considered by Spaniards as the top expression 
of their current democracy, makes it very easy to understand that many 
historians and political scientists focus instead on seeing the sixties and 
seventies as foreshadowing the future of Spain, full of European successes, 
and thus as a way for exorcising the demons of its shaming dictatorial past.  
 
This is the reason that the final democratic character of the EEC is 
emphasized in the standard explanation which is taught.12  In fact, the recent 
history of Spain has been written with a lot of empathy to the idea of Europe. 
Beneyto, from a well representative position, for the purpose of “volver a 
diseñar el aporte de España a Europa y de Europa a España no sólo en 
términos de contribuciones netas, retornos equivalentes y subsidios al 
cereal”13, clearly expresses, “Europa es esencialmente una realidad cultural, y 
no en primer término económica o jurídica. Si no se reconoce esto, caemos en 
la morosidad cultural.”14 Or Moreno Juste, who advises about the risks of a  
“valoración de nuestra relación con Europa desde un cálculo meramente 
instrumental, utilitario y cortoplacista, y que tiende a ignorar la perspectiva 
                                                 
9
 José Luis García Delgado and Juan Carlos Jiménez, “La economía” in La España del siglo 
XX ed. Santos Juliá et al (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2003), 429. 
10
 Ismael Saz,  "Algunas consideraciones a propósito del debate sobre la naturaleza del    
Franquismo y el lugar histórico de la Dictadura",  in  Franquismo/Fascismo , ed. Joan M. 
Thomas (Reus, FESNJR, 2001), 29-52. 
11
 Santos Juliá, “Orígenes sociales de la democracia española”, Ayer 15 (1994): 183 and 180.  
12
 María del Carmen Bolaños Mejías, “El proyecto político de Jean Monnet”in Enseñar la 
idea de Europa, ed. Yolanda Gómez Sánchez and Javier Alvarado Planas (Madrid: UNED-
Ramón Areces, 2004), 373-387. 
13
 José María Beneyto, Europa: tragedia y razón  en el pensamiento español del siglo XX 
(Madrid, Taurus: 1999), 15. 
14
 Ibid, 15. 
BSPHS 39:1 (2014) 
 112 
finalista inherente al europeísmo como proyecto colectivo a todos los 
europeos” 15 
 
Certainly some historians react with a predictable enthusiasm when it 
comes to avoid the conflictive factors of the recent history of Spain. Hence all 
the strange, special, surprising and incoherent stuff is cleared away. And 
nothing has been more surprising in Spanish recent history than Franco’s 
application to the EEC.16   
 
Technocracy: Europe as a rational option? 
  
The argument in this historiography makes the obvious connections, 
that the growing social and economic convergence od Spain with Europe soon 
led to its corollary: the social request for democracy. However, this idea is 
based on Rostow’s take-off model. Yet the role of Franco’s technoray is 
overlooked.17 The Spanish edition of  Rostow’s The Stages of Economic 
Growth (1959) was introduced by the main technocratic minister of Franco’s 
dictatorship, Laureano López Rodó (1920-2000), a former jurist with a view 
of statuary regulation and an enthusiastic follower of Ernst Forsthoff’s theories 
(1902-1974), who maintained that “current constitutional questions are 
actually administrative questions.”18 The title was significantly translated to 
Spanish as Políticas y Etapas de Crecimiento. 
For the most part the studies about the Spanish Transition point out the 
European behaviour by Spaniards during the sixties and seventies. Many 
historians and political scientists write about the historical opportunity this 
created for achiveving democracy. As a sample of this Spanish convergence 
with Europe, there is nothing better than Santos Juliá’s words: “Spaniards had 
                                                 
15
 Antonio Moreno Juste, “Del ‘Problema de España’ a…”, Op. Cit., 300. More samples by a 
different autor in David Rubio García, “La política exterior española y la Comunidad 
Europea/Unión  Europea” in “La política exterior española en el siglo XX”,  ed. Rafael 
Calduch Cervera (Madrid: Ediciones de las Ciencias sociales, 1994),  201-222. 
16
 The European application by Franco’s Regime was made “de forma audaz”, José Reig 
Cruañes, Identificación y alienación, la cultura política en el Tardofranquismo (Valencia: 
University Press, 2007), 252.  
17
 Teresa Carnero, “La renovación de la historia política”; Casanova, "Modernización y 
democratización: reflexiones sobre la Transición española a la democracia" in Teresea 
Carnero ed., Modernización, Desarrollo político y Cambio social (Madrid: Alianza, 1992). 
Julián Casanova, “Las enseñanzas de la Transición democrática en España”, Ayer 15 (1994): 
15-54. Juan Pablo Fusi and Jordi Palafox, España: 1808-1996. El desafío de la modernidad 
(Madrid: Espasa Calpe, 1998, third edition).  Carme Molinero and Pere Ysas, “Tercera Parte: 
Modernización económica e inmovilismo político (1959-1975)” in Jesus A. Martínez, 
Historia de España Siglo XX  1939-1996 (Madrid: Cátedra, 2003, second edition) 
18
 Coord. Raymond Carr, Volumen I: Política, Ejército, Iglesia, Economía y Administración in 
Historia de España Menéndez Pidal, Tomo XLI, La época de Franco (1939-1975), ed. José 
María Jover Zamora, (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe,1968-2004): 599. A brief about Laureano López 
Rodó is  Antonio Cañellas Mas,  “Laureano López Rodó: el nuevo reformismo franquista”, 
Aportes 60, XXI  (1/2006): 143-153. 
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understood that Europe was their future.”19 This historiographical perspective 
(and mostly Rostow’s) is based on the conflict between the anachronism of the 
regime and the convergence with West Europe within social, economic and 
administrative fields,20 and this perspective is understood as a confirmation of 
Weber’s script for development.21 An obvious question remains: if Spaniards 
understood Europe was their future in the sixties and seventies, didn’t the 
technocrats of Franco’s government feel the same? According to this 
governing view, Spanish modernization was within European paramethers and 
was promoted by technocratic ministers. That would drive anyone to consider 
positively the work and legacy of the technocratic ministers, which generally 
has been assumed to have been motivated only for the economic survival of 
Franco’s dictatorship in the asphyxia caused by autarky.  
 
 The legend or cliché of the Stabilization Act takes for granted that  
Franco accepted it only to avoid or delay a democratic transition.22 From this 
comes a predictable second conclusion, that the technocrats as a staff were far 
away from the presumed essence of the Regime, which was the belief in 
autarky.23 This explanation forgets the ideological affiliation of the technocrats 
and, thus, locates them at a midway point between the Regime and the  
conditions for its final crisis and Spain’s transformation. In short, Franco’s 
technocracy is considered as a dynamical elite that knew to see the European 
horizon, but was unable to see the contradiction between the regime and the 
modernization (and democratization) character of their European policies. 
They were an important group in a short part of the transition. Through them, 
a dictatorship interested in deleting Spanish democracy finally made the 
conditions for the return of the democracy.  
 
In fact, if one emphasizes that the technocratic policies started the 
European convergence of Spain that ultimately led to democracy, there is a 
need to face a disturbing idea: there are other functional prerequisites for 
                                                 
19
 Santos Juliá, Op. Cit., 180. 
20
 Social field: Reig Cruañes, Op. Cit. Juliá, “Orígenes sociales…”, Op. Cit. José Enrique 
Rodríguez Ibáñez, Después de una dictadura: cultura autoritaria y transición política en 
España, (Madrid: Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, 1987). Economic field: García 
Delgado and Jiménez, Op. Cit. Administrative field: Casanova, "Modernización y…”, Op. Cit. 
Casanova, “Las enseñanzas…”, Op. Cit. Mariano Baena del Alcázar, Elites y conjuntos de 
poder en España (1939-1992). Un estudio cuantitativo sobre Parlamento, Gobierno y 
Administración y gran empresa. (Madrid: Tecnos, 1999). Miscelaneous: Victor Pérez Díaz, La 
primacía de la sociedad civil, (Madrid: Alianza, 1993).. 
21
 Giacomo Marramao, Cielo y Tierra, Genealogía de la secularización, (Barcelona: Paidós: 
1994),  57. 
22
 Pablo Martín Aceña “¿Qué hubiera sucedido si Franco no hubiera aceptado el Plan de 
Estabilización?” in Historia virtual de España (1870-2004) ¿Qué hubiera pasado si…? ed. 
Nigel Townson (Madrid: Taurus, 2004) 
23
 María Luz Morán, “Elites y cultura política en la España democrática”, in pp. 185-222 en  
Pilar del CASTILLO and Ismael Crespo ed. Cultura política, Enfoques teóricos y análisis 
empíricos (Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch, 1997): 205. 
BSPHS 39:1 (2014) 
 114 
achieving democracy.24 These are overlooked in the studies quoted in the three 
previous paragraphs, all of which emerged from the modernization paradigm. 
In this explanation, there is no room for the civil society, the political 
opposition or the international context. These studies could be criticized for 
supporting themselves with a renewed, structural update of the Spanish 
dichotomy that previously produced dysfunction, so that the result --Spanish 
democracy—was an anomaly, an unforeseen spin-off from the dictatorship. 
The conclusion is that while the aim of technocratic policies was not to 
achieve the democracy, nonetheless these policies inadvertently helped create 
some of the conditions for achieving democracy.25 “Parecería que el de la 
modernización es el único paradigma realmente existente en la historiografía 
y las ciencias sociales, o, al menos, el único aplicable en España” 26 
 
Despite the emphasized importance of the internal differences of 
Francoist elites as the ones that explain the final evolution of the regime27, 
these are not introduced as some of the main reasons of the final evolution of 
Spain by the studies from the modernization paradigm. Yet others have been 
praised for identifying the exogenic factors of the convergence; they link the 
technocratic policies more directly with the European democratic future of 
Spain, far away from the technocrat’s ideological tradition. 28 Inherent in these 
approaches is the idea that technocratic governments were more deliberate in 
expressing a preference for a future grounded in European rationality instead 
of Spanish exceptionalism. Franco’s technocratic ministers and senior officers 
allow us to consider the Francoist regime not as an aberration but rather as a 
                                                 
24
 Martín Aceña, Op. Cit, 25. 
25
 Javier Tusell, “La transición a la democracia en España como fenómeno de Historia 
Política”, Ayer  15 (1994): 62. 
26
 Ismael Saz, “Introducción”, Ayer 68  (2007), 29.  
27
 Ismael Saz, “Mucho más que crisis políticas: el agotamiento de dos proyectos”, Ayer 68 
(2007), 143. 
28
 Please Cf. the studies quoted in notes 21 and 25 with these studies from history and political 
science that underline the importance of international organizations in internal, compared 
processes of transition to democracy: Juan Carlos Pereira Castañares "Transición y política 
exterior: el nuevo reto de la historiografía española", Ayer 42 (2001). Charles Powell, 
"Cambio de régimen y política exterior: España, 1975-1989", in Javier Tusell; Juan Avilés, 
Rosa Pardo Sanz, eds. La política exterior de España en el siglo XX (Madrid: Biblioteca 
Nueva, 2000).  Geoffey Pridham, Encouraging democracy. The international context of 
regimen transition in Southern Europe (Londres: Leicester University Press, 1991). Geoffrey 
Pridham,  Eric Herring, George Sanford, Building Democracy? The international dimension 
of democratizacion in Eastern Europe (Londres: Leicester University Press, 1994).  Laurence 
Whitehead, "Democracy by convergence" in Laurence Whitehead ed. The international 
dimensions of democratizacion. Europe and the  Americas (Oxford: University Press, 1994). 
Also Cf. The quoted Works with  the different meaning of convergence in a process of 
international influence of democratization used by Philippe C. SCHMITTER, "The influence 
of the international context upon the choice of national institutions and policies in neo-
democracies" in Whitehead ed., The international dimensions of democratización… Op. Cit. 
Encarnación Lemus, En Hamelin… La Transición Española más allá de la frontera, (Oviedo: 
Septem, 2001). 
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traditionalist and meta-historical one, based on the idea that “en política 
exterior, el régimen franquista adoptó una filosofía pragmática, a veces 
cínica, conculcadora de la retórica oficial, basada en la pretensión imperial y 
en la afirmación nacionalista frente al rechazo europeo” 29 
 
Why did a deeply anti-democratic regime make up its mind to apply 
for entry into the EEC and thus its adherence to a select club of European 
democracies?  The application was made by a dictatorship, which did not 
deserve the association. Much of the specialized historiography the article has 
examined simply emphasizes the tangential character of Franco’s 
application.30 According with this view, the surprising application was the 
result of a process of international opening that was derived from the 
economic changes after autarky, mostly the policies of deregulation and 
development, which are regarded as technocratic decisions taken just for the 
economic survival of Spain. With this as the main explanation for Spain’s 
application, there is an absence of rhetoric or discourse behind the decision, 
and the explanation of Spain’s decision is reduced to an economic-institutional 
one, especially one grounded in the circumstances of trade and diplomacy. 
The EEC --remember, one of the backbones of Maastricht’s European Union-- 
is regarded as a mere technical organization. This is a great risk --a new 
paradox-- for a pro-European historiography, because Europeanism has long 
been cast as a larger, collective project, which goes beyond the 
implementation of technical or economic policy.  
 
In reinterpreting Spain’s application to the EEC, we can connect many 
trends. First, the technocracy ruled out the survival of the regime after Franco, 
because it recognized that Spain’s economic problems were more important 
and deeper than the nature of the government and continuity for the purpose of 
national prestige.  This led to a more rational character in foreign affairs, and 
thus it means that the progressive begining of a new Spanish foreign policy 
can be linked to the technocrats. As a result, there is an explicit continuity 
                                                 
29
 Armengod, Ramón, “Prólogo” in  Rafael Calduch ed. La política exterior española en el 
siglo XX ( Madrid:  Ediciones de las Ciencias sociales, 1994), 10. 
30
 Francisco Aldecoa, "La política exterior española en perspectiva histórica, 1945- 1984. De 
la autocracia al Estado de derecho", Sistema 63 (1984). Lamo de Espinosa, Op. Cit. María 
Teresa La Porte, La política europea del régimen de Franco (1957-1962) (Pamplona,: 
Universidad de Navarra press, 1992). Roberto Mesa, Op. Cit. Antonio Moreno Juste, 
“Reacción del nacional-catolicismo ante los inicios de la  construcción europea: la 
constitución del europeísmo oficial, 1949-1953”, pp. 627-643 in Javier Tusell, Julio Gil 
Pecharromán and Feliciano Montero, eds. Estudios sobre la derecha española contemporánea 
(Madrid: UNED, 1993); España y el proceso de construcción europea 1945-1997 (Barcelona: 
Ariel, 1998); Franquismo y construcción europea, 1951-1962: anhelo, necesidad y realidad 
de la aproximación a Europa (Madrid: Tecnos, 1998). Rosa Pardo Sanz, "La etapa Castiella y 
el final del régimen, 1957-1975" in Javier Tusell; Juan Avilés, Rosa Pardo Sanz, eds. Op. Cit. 
David Rubio García, Op. Cit.  
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between the international opening of Franco’s regime in the late fifties and 
Spain’s subsequent democratic foreign policy.31   
 
Many would argue that the claimed glorious, autarkic, old-fashioned 
rhetoric of the regime had presumably been the unique and honest affirmation 
of its external personality.32 Yet this historiography is seduced by a notion of a 
Hispanic Weltpolitik, the delusions of splendors. Here are echoes of the 
victory of an earlier era that once connected anticommunist rhetoric and 
collaboration with the powers of Axis, illusions of Austria’s Empire and 
nationalist reaffirmation across Europe. Therefore when Franco’s Spain 
applied to join Europe, it was only in order to survive, and the regimes tried to 
instrumentalize or betray its autarkic essence. This means the application was 
just the opposite of an ideological project, an idea that is not so divorced from 
the notion of a technocratic staff driving policy at this time. Foreign afairs was 
simply driven by the economic policies of the technocracy, as a paradigmatical 
autonomous Realpolitik. The factors that emphasize Spain’s adaptation to 
European change have been emphasized and the ideological reasons of the 
dictatorship for applying have been downsized. 
 
But what if one considers the application rooted in the political 
tradition of technocratic ministers and staff; now the reasons of the application 
become less benevolent, and more fully linked to the idea of acting in order to 
preserve the dictatorship.  
 
The technocrats and an anti-liberal view of European integration 
 
The technocrats of Franco were the third generation of the Spanish, 
neo-traditionalist ideology, also known as national-catholicism, which 
included important ideological commitments to economic modernization. The 
cultural crisis of late 19th century had established the basis of the new anti-
democratic right-wing of Europe and the following dictatorial experiences. In 
Spain, those late-century anti-liberal movements were called Regeneracionism 
and "Ninety--eightism"(Noventayochismo). Rooted in both  regeneration and 
theological natural law, Maeztu's thinking had articulated the neotraditionalist 
ideology of Acción Española before the Republican challenge during the 
thirties. This was the second generation Spanish reactionary  nationalism, or 
National-Catholicism. A similar phenomenon had  happened in Western 
Europe in the form of Action Française, Associazione Nacionalista Italiana 
and the German National People’s Party, DVNP.  
                                             
                                                 
31
 Rosa Pardo and Florentino Portero, Op. Cit. 
32
 Ángel Viñas, Op. Cit.. Cf. Francisco Veiga; Enrique Ucelay Da Cal and Ángel Duarte, La 
paz simulada. Una historia de la Guerra Fría, 1941-1991 (Madrid: Alianza, 1997), 387-418 
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Maeztu’s guidelines assumed the acceptance of Weber’s subjective 
perspectives of modernization in a limited way. He challenged the coexistence  
of modern realities and the social community inspired by God and, also, 
advocated non-democratic politics as a way to avoid the rise of dangerous 
“perspectives” from modernity, such as republicanism. His solution was a kind 
of “trickle down theory” which theoretically would guarantee economic 
prosperity for everyone through modernization and an international place for 
Spain in Europe. For the purposes of this study, this point is very important. 
This tradition had a European vocation but rejected enlightened liberal 
tradition. The Francoist technocrats were the third generation in this line of 
thought and greatly built on Maeztu’s ideas. Most influential in the views of 
Franco’s technocracy were the three backbones of Maeztu’s political 
philosophy, defined as neotraditional, nationalist and productive.33  
 
Suffice it to say here that Franco's regime became characteristic of this  
synthesis of both the great European nationalist and anti-liberal streams: 
reactionary nationalism and fascism,  having an ideological predominance of 
the first and a certain rhetorical predominence of the second.34 This 
reactionary tradition will reach three generations of 20th century Spanish 
monarchists,including the technocrats from Opus Dei, but not only them. The 
first generation in Maeztu’s wake was related to the subvertive goals of 
neotraditionalism via the review Acción Española. The Civil War was 
understood a necessary stage for eradicating Anti-España. After the Civil War, 
the second generation became concerned with nationalism and it showed an 
interest in the scholarly debate with the Falange: “the problem of Spain”. Now 
the Spanish “body” could be developed with no danger of secularization 
(economy, administration, foreign affairs).35  The technocracy was the third 
generation and represented an update of this Spanish neotraditionalism in the 
fifties and sixties. It was the ideological line of Maeztu’s vision: the 
                                                 
33
 The Neotradionalist and Maeztu’s influence to be found here: Alfonso Botti, Cielo y dinero, (Madrid: 
Alianza, 1992); Antonio Cañellas Mas, “La tecnocracia franquista: el sentido ideológico del desarrollo 
económico”, Studia Historica Historia Contemporánea, 24 (2006). 257-288; Pedro Carlos González 
Cuevas, Acción Española, Teología Política y Nacionalismo Autoritario en España 1913-1936, (Madrid: 
Tecnos, 1998); Pedro Carlos González Cuevas,  El pensamiento político de la derecha española en el siglo 
XX. De la crisis de la Restauración al Estado de partidos 1898-2000, (Madrid: Tecnos, 2005); Pedro 
Carlos González Cuevas, Historia de las derechas españolas. De la Ilustración a nuestros días, (Madrid: 
Biblioteca Nueva, 2000); Pedro Carlos González Cuevas, La tradición bloqueada. Tres ideas políticas en 
España: el primer Ramiro de Maeztu, Charles Maurras y Carl Schmitt, (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2002); 
Pedro Carlos González Cuevas, Maeztu, Biografía de un nacionalista español, (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 
2003); José LuisVillacañas, Ramiro de Maeztu y el ideal de la burguesía en España, (Barcelona: Espasa, 
2000). 
34
   Ismael Saz "Paradojas…”, Op. Cit.  
35
 Ismael Saz,  España contra España, los nacionalismos franquistas, (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 
2003); Santos Juliá, Historia de las dos Españas, (Madrid: Taurus, 2004). The metaphore is 
mine. 
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development of and institutionalization of a political project which was to 
become an impersonal, administrative and predictable dictatorship.36 This 
means a kind of an essential, sophisticated theocracy. Some descriptive 
studies, even recent, underline the similarities and differences between the 
postwar European right-wing tendency to Christian Democracy and Spanish 
neotraditionalism, then paradoxically surprise themselves because the 
government of the dictatorship did not follow the same stream that European, 
democratic right-wings did.37 
 
The technocratic ministers tried to take advantage of European 
transformations The technocrats, as with any dictatorial elite, could not 
pretend to be excessively cynical towards exercising power. The dictatorial 
elite needed to demonstrate that, over time, power was becoming as 
representative as possible, at least in appearance. So, by the fifties, the 
pragmatic and technical programmatic references of the regime became more 
important than the emotive ones in the rhetoric: if the dictatorship allowed the  
achievement of  welfare, focusing the energy of the people in productive work, 
then this  could be used to demonstrate to the world a kind of passive 
consensus about the dictatorship existed in Spain; thus more overt political 
and ideological debates could be avoided. In the domestic context this was the 
discourse of exercising-legitimation: the legitimation of Franco's regime 
regarding pragmatic and handy terms, supposedly European and Western 
ones, emphasizing the power of the economic development. In terms of 
foreign policy, this meant the international and European projection of the 
regime in the good context of the economic growth and the Cold War anti-
communism. Linking Spain to the EEC and Western context would encourage 
both the necessary stability of the Spanish economy to extend welfare to the 
population, á la Europe, and would also solidify the institutionalization of an 
anti-liberal regime after the predictable death of Franco. 
 
However, it seems that for the most part, the quoted historiography 
assumes that Franco’s dictatorship decided to apply for the EEC from an 
ideological vacuum. In fact, it applied to the EEC within a context of 
institutional desires and different ways to view the power of integration. The 
dictatorship tried to get support from an international arena full of points of 
attraction to Spain, which did not necessarily or totally exclude each other.  
                                                 
36
 Pedro Carlos González Cuevas, “La derecha tecnocrática”, Historia y Política 18 (2007): 
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37
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nacionalismo español en la época contemporánea, ed. Ismael Saz Campos and Ferran 
Archilés (Valencia: University Press, 2012), 243-260. 
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Franco’s regime only tried to suit them and link them to their own goals. The 
integration of external markets, the function of Monnet’s original logic for 
integration; the intergovernmental model of cooperation (De Gaulle’s 
favorite); linking up with the profitable and adaptable elements of the 
governing discourses in European forums; capitalism, but not liberalism; Cold 
War, but  counterrevolutionary-obsessed; pro-Europeanism, but preferably a 
supra-national Europe; all of these help explain Spanish preferences of 
Europeanism at the moment of the application to the EEC. 
 
Considering the ideological affiliation of Franco’s technocracy, there is 
not such a contradiction between the maintenance of the regime and a 
European horizon. Franco’s technocrats were more than money doctors. Their 
economic policies were designed to do more than just ensure the survival of 
the regime. They were the product of a strategic certainty, the last update of 
the reactionary and financially modernizing tradition of Spanish political 
thinking. They were not the lack of ideology or a relaxed ideology, nor even a 
strategic mistake of the regime. 
 
The progressive deregulation of Spanish economy and the opening, in 
different steps, to the international arena all through the fifties, were all pieces 
of evidence in the argument that the technocrats were gradually strengthening 
the importance of neotraditionalist ideology in Spain’s policies. The 1953 
Concordat with the Holly See, the 1953 Military Bases Agreement with  
United States of America, the growing role of Spanish Embassies in spreading 
throughout the Western World, the final admission of Spain to International 
Organizations such as the UN (United Nations), 1955, the ILO (International 
Labour  Organization), 1956, the IMF (International Monetary Fund), 1958, 
the WB (World Bank), 1958 and the OEEC (Organization for European Co-
Operation), 1958 (later called OECD, Organization for Economic 
Development and Cooperation) were all part of this broader movement.  
 
Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, the studies about Franco’s application to EEC have 
underlined the historic importance of the event, but have dodged the strategic 
reasons for technocrats and neotraditionalists to advocate such a policy. These 
reasons emphasized the links between anti-liberalism and European 
integration. The technocrat’s connection with their political past was stronger 
than their connection with the Spanish democratic future in Europe. In 
conclusion, Franco’s technocracy and its actions were not a contradiction of 
the dictatorship, but in fact, a resounding confirmation of it. 
 
